Laws and Rules: A Critical Structural Relationship

Laws and Rules: A Critical Structural Relationship



The relationship between laws and rules is an important element of any restructuring plan for the telecommunications market. Whether the government seeks an elaborate or a minimal regulatory process, there almost certainly will have to be some regulatory oversight (or similar government management) of the telecommunications market during the period of its most radical transition.22 Immediately relegating the regulatory process to the role of supplying the insignificant details that cannot be included in legislation is, almost certainly, a serious mistake. Regardless of the form and structure of the proposed government oversight, the structure of and reasons for the oversight process should be considered and developed with great care. Such attention is warranted whether the government envisions an elaborate, independent, and extremely public regulatory system, such as the one that exists in the United States, or a very private and consultative approach, such as is followed by the various involved ministries in Japan, or a quasi-public institutional arrangement, such as the one that the United Kingdom established with the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel). Though there is certainly no universal solution to the problem of structuring the relationship between laws and rules, it is clear that a lack of attention to the relationship, and to the purpose of the regulatory structure adopted, will produce substantial problems in the long term. (In the discussion that follows, the term "rules" used is a short-hand reference for various nonlegislative decisions, including ministerial ordinances, regulatory policy statements, and other similar actions that vary from one jurisdiction to another.)

Should laws adopted by legislators define broad goals, and rules adopted by regulators supply the details?

In general, this is an approach that has been taken in the United States. The Communications Act is a broad, flexible piece of legislation implemented by the rules that the FCC adopts. Significant benefits of this approach include the following:

The benefits of having an independent regulatory body to implement the expansive policies of flexible legislation must be balanced against the danger that legislation may be so general as to be almost inconsequential. Legislation must establish some general guidelines, such as the essential interests to be preserved and protected. For example, the general objectives set out in the law might indicate whether the needs of users or service providers are to be paramount, how the demands of the business and the residential sectors are to be balanced, and whether the government will serve as an impediment to, or a proponent of, market entry.

The law also should at least outline the process by which rules will be adopted and violations redressed. In other words, the regulatory agency should be a creation of the law.

The distinction between laws and rules should not be taken to suggest that rules may have only a narrow focus and be concerned only with detail. In fact, rules themselves may define broad policies that are consistent with the broader commands of applicable legislation. Other more specific rules may serve simply to implement legislative policies. Thus, regulators, acting within the general framework set up by laws, may themselves adopt certain goals. With other rules, the regulators may define the tools to be used to achieve such goals.

What is an example of an expansive goal or objective in the United States that appears in the Communications Act and that is implemented by the FCC's rules and policies?

Perhaps the most common example of such an objective is the concept of the "public interest, convenience, and necessity," which is central to the Communications Act. The Communications Act generally requires that the FCC, as well as facilities and service providers, act in ways that will advance the "public interest." The term itself, however, is not defined.

The FCC is given the responsibility of defining this term, in light of comments that it receives from the public. So long as the FCC's decisions appear to be promoting the "public interest," as expressed in public comments, the courts will tend to support agency decisions that are challenged in court. Congress also generally will support the agency, so long as it concurs in the FCC's perception of the public interest.

During the 1980s, for example, Congress repeatedly expressed its concern that the FCC was deregulating too quickly. In other words, although the FCC perceived deregulation as consistent with the public interest, Congress generally feared that excessive deregulation would be contrary to the public interest. Many members of Congress expressed their concerns about rising prices and lower quality service, and they suggested that to the extent deregulation produced these results, continued deregulation was not consistent with the public interest. According to these legislators, the "public interest" demanded attention to the goals of affordable, reliable, high-quality service; such goals should take precedence over any desire for a less regulated marketplace. To these legislators, the FCC had become obsessed with promoting a free market, regardless of the results that the market would produce. As a result, Congress questioned whether competition, at all costs, was in the "public interest." As Congress and the FCC clashed over these issues, a contentious period of policy making in the United States ensued.

For some, the controversy reflected a breakdown in the process. Critics argued that Congress was trying to regulate and to exert excessive control over the FCC.

For others, however, the debate illustrated the extent to which Congress and the FCC can interact to determine national policy, without the need for legislative action. Although disagreements between Congress and the FCC sometimes stalled market development, eventually the process moved forward. Congress did not adopt laws that would prevent future change. The FCC responded to congressional inquiry by moderating some of its policies.

Are there other similar goals that U.S. law prescribes to direct the development of U.S. communications policy?

There are many such goals. Not all are set out in the Communications Act. Some are embodied in the Constitution. Others are contributed by other federal laws. Still others are defined by the actions of the FCC and other government departments and agencies. The following list includes some of the prominent fundamental goals of U.S. communications policies and rules:

How are some of these goals reflected specifically in requirements of the Communications Act?

In providing a flexible structure for various services and service providers, and in outlining both procedures to be followed and actions to be avoided by the FCC, the Communications Act advances many of the policy goals summarized above. The Communications Act applies these general principles to matters related specifically to communications.

Without pretending to be an exhaustive list, the following concepts illustrate how the Communications Act encourages some of the broad goals summarized above: 23

Many of these provisions are general, consistent with the practice in the United States of writing and adopting broad and flexible legislation. These provisions, however, have been given content by FCC action and court interpretation.26

How do the FCC's rules "give content" to these broad goals?

The rules set forth elaborate procedures to be followed, as well as the details of various standards and methods; the relatively brief Communications Act is supplemented by five printed volumes of FCC rules. The FCC also issues tens of thousands of pages of written decisions each year to explain its actions, examine various policies, and satisfy numerous legal requirements.

Some notable examples of rules that "give content" to the policy goals outlined in the Communications Act include (1) for common carriage, elaborate rules that instruct common carriers how to allocate costs and justify tariffs, and, more recently, rules that set forth the methods to be followed in calculating price caps; (2) rules that direct federal and state regulators to confer on issues that affect both intrastate and interstate activities; (3) rules that establish application forms and licensing procedures to be followed in seeking authorizations to provide radio and wire services, and that set out various standards and requirements intended to ensure that such services are made available widely and by a diverse group of service providers; (4) voluminous technical rules designed to ensure that the public receives high-quality service without interference and to encourage innovation by the private market; and (5) procedures for obtaining type-approval and registration of equipment, all of which permits the private market to meet demand subject to minimal government intervention.

As discussed above, FCC decisions that interpret such general concepts as the "public interest" also give meaning to the law. In addition, because they bear the weight of public comment, these decisions will provide different interpretations of such concepts over time, reflecting changing values and attitudes in society.

It is not possible to provide a precise formula for the relationship between the legal and regulatory systems that will govern telecommunications. The system will depend upon many variables, including the general goals and values to be furthered, the extent to which a regulatory process develops, the type of regulatory process desired, the extent to which public participation in regulatory decision making is desired, the role of the courts in the system, and the financial resources available to support the system. The U.S. system reflects the preferences of a country that has a long tradition of administrative procedure, a bias toward an open and elaborate regulatory system, an active court system, and a fairly substantial budget for funding regulatory activity.

In general, because legislation is difficult to enact and even more difficult to amend, laws should be liberally drafted to provide for flexibility. Narrow, specific laws can stifle development, particularly in a field as dynamic as telecommunications. The laws also should define or establish procedures that further the legislative goals. Thus, in the United States, there is a powerful, authoritative regulatory agency designed to further the public interest by following procedures that rely upon public participation.

Usually, rules provide the manner and details of implementation, thereby supplementing the broadly expressed goals of the laws. However, this relationship between the laws and the rules presumes some type of relationship between the legislator and the regulator.27 In addition, to the extent that the laws require extensive supplementation by rules, a more active regulatory process -- and, possibly, a more expensive one -- may be required.

Rules need not be viewed solely as sources of ministerial detail. In fact, rules may provide significant policy direction, subject in all cases to the overriding mandate of the laws. Such an approach enables the regulatory institution to adopt more expansive goals over time, as market, social, and political conditions dictate. In any event, the relationship of the rules to the laws, and of the regulator to the legislator, must be carefully considered in structuring the law itself. The regulatory process is, in fact, an important tool to be used in the development and management of the telecommunications market; the process also may be a goal, in and of itself, to the extent that it may become a source of fairness and public empowerment.